For Christmas I was given a copy of Jean Beliveau's memoirs. I have been reading the book and am only pages from finished now.
What strikes the reader of this book, other than the fact that Beliveau just seems like a genuinely down-to-earth, nice guy, is how the Habs have changed since he came and left the team. Beliveau speaks about it a bit, but is too generous to indict anyone too much.
The Canadiens, as we know from their record, dominated the NHL from the mid-50s to the 1980s. Their success is gauged by Stanley Cups and other trophies, but it was built with amazing strategy and foresight. While the slow down in Cups is an obvious red flag for this organization, it is perhaps the dissociation with the latter that is more significant.
The Canadiens of the 1930s by all accounts were a good team, but by the late part of the decade, it was clear they weren't the pace setters in the league. That honour, on examination, must by rights go to the Toronto Maple Leafs who had the championships and the strategic minds to go with. Someone at this critical juncture recognized enough was enough and plucked a towering hockey mind (Tommy Gorman) to steer the club. He in turn found his man in Dick Irvin and did what it took to secure his service. Then, when Gorman left and somewhere along the way, and I won't get into the intrigue, Conn Smythe and Frank Selke split company and Selke arrived in Montreal. Beliveau doesn't go into all that much about Selke himself, but there are a few interesting snippets that point to the kind of manager he was.
First and foremost, it seems that Selke was an excellent (if not infallible) evaluator of talent. But being sensible, he also knew not to rely completely on his eye, and he probably realized that his rivals were pretty good too. He knew quantity of talent would likely yield better quality and so he set out creating teams and leagues to feed the Canadiens. The 1950s Habs were a big product of the seeds he had sown in his earlier tenure with the Habs and by the time the Canadiens were ready to start winning Cups they had too much talent to be stopped.
We predictably focus on the on-ice talent, but I think Selke knew the importance of off-ice talent as well. The advisors he kept around him and the apprentices he developed were just as important as those players. When Dick Irvin left as coach, Selke (according to Beliveau) wanted to replace his friend with an old acquaintance from Toronto. But it's a testament to the man that he was obviously open to collaboration as Ken Reardon was able to convince him of the case for Toe Blake. Greatness was retained in the organization in that instance, because greatness was recognized.
While players would change and Cups would come and go, the commitment to quality people in the front office was clearly there long after Selke. On his retirement, his replacement was a well-groomed candidate from within the organization, Sam Pollock. Pollock was to take the team into a much less stable era (with expansion, a draft and a rival league) and duplicate, if even exceed what Selke had done.
Their legacy
The legacy of Irvin and Selke was passed to Blake and Pollock and Bowman. From there it was absorbed no doubt by some in the organization, both on (Lemaire, Robinson, Gainey, Dryden, Savard) and off the ice (Cliff Fletcher, Caron, etc.)
Following Pollock's decision to retire, he apparently struggled with the naming of a replacement. Though he clearly recognized in Scotty Bowman a unique talent, he also recognized a fiery temper that might befit a GM of a team with other egos.
Some point to the selection of Irving Grundman as the beginning of the end for the Canadiens dominance, and perhaps it was. But at this stage, the Habs still had a bevy of learned people in their employ who knew the ways of Selke and Pollock.
Perhaps it's not important where the chain was broken, only that we know it was. Somehow the team that provided the model for both management and coaching for many decades ended up with Rejean Houle guiding Mario Tremblay. Somewhere along the line the braintrust filtered down the drain.
How it happened is not something that can be treated in one blog post, but there's little question that it did. With the braintrust gone, so was the culture of patientce and the feeling that the management held the upper hand over the always braying Montreal media.
That was ages ago now.
The attempt to restore the line was made in 2003 when Bob Gainey was headhunted for a return. Gainey, a 1970s Canadien himself must have learned a thing or two from Pollock and from Selke.
Restoring the tradition
What is missed by people that believed Gainey was just another in the line of graduates from the Montreal school is critical review of what he actually did. A review suggests there was some conviction, but perhaps not enough patience, and certainly not enough examination of what can be done under the current regulations to push an advantage over opponents to the extremes that Selke and Pollock once did.
I write this piece in the shadow of the Mike Cammalleri trade, and so it may seem like a criticism. Perhaps it should be. But I could have written it without that particular trade.
Gauthier himself is clearly an intelligent man and a thinker who puts care into his work. Yet he's no Selke. This would perhaps not be so important were there no mirrors of the great GM ion the modern game, but that doesn't appear to be so. With the Red Wings topping the West for yet another season, their management team shines above all. But there are examples of much more clever manoeuvring than that accomplished by Gauthier (and indeed Gainey) in San Jose, Philadelphia, Boston and other places.
As a Habs fan, I have to ask why.
Why should an organization that learned time and time again the importance of quality running through every vein (on or off ice) be so content to fill its ranks so? Why should all the organizational currency in managers and coaches be allowed to filter out only to come back and haunt the team?
In its longest ever Cup drought, the Canadiens need a Tommy Gorman moment. An admission that better people exist somewhere and that finding them should become a priority. Because Gorman doesn't become Irvin to Selke to Blake to Pollock to Bowman without that moment of truth.
I wish this team of owners would stop hoping they'll luck into something and put some of the Markov profits into some serious recruiting efforts. And for me this doesn't mean Gauthier needs to go, just that he has to be surrounded and fed by the best budgets will allow. And that in moments of pause, assistant coaches, 16 months into their time with the organization won't have to be the lone available option.
M. Jean Beliveau is far too much of a gentleman to ever say it, but every line between the lines in his memoir spoke of quality. I can't see how he wouldn't be with us on this.
Showing posts with label Bowman. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bowman. Show all posts
Wednesday, January 18, 2012
Wednesday, February 09, 2011
Jacques Martin
Gotta Go?
Every few days bloggers like myself receive comments about the team, its players, its management. Since Jacques Martin was hired, it's a pretty good bet that comments about him having to go come along just as frequently.
Just yesterday, a Guest posted this:
It was a comment among many similar comments seen at LIW and HI/O and FHF, and any Canadiens discussion forum. Usually I would respond to this comment in place. but as it seems to be a recurring theme, I thought a more lasting form of response was fitting.
The complaint
As far as I can tell, the common elements of the complaint against Martin are that:
a) He is boring
b) He employs a boring system of hockey (sometimes named "the trap")
c) He is stifling the team's talent
d) He doesn't yell enough behind the bench
e) This is costing the team wins
f) He has never won anything
These are very fair points. He is quite a boring interviewee (Personally, I deal with that by not listening to any of his interviews). He does favour some defensive responsibility, a variation on the trap. And he certainly never yells at the referees. All true.
Where I start to take issue is with the notion that we extrapolate these things into our personal conclusions. That defensive play is stifling the talent, that this is costing the team wins. That not ranting over calls is costing points and wins.
I think some of these stretch the imagination. Don't you?
To those who really believe he is stifling the team. I ask you to consider an honest assessment of the talent on the team. What sets this group apart from the 9 teams ahead of the Canadiens that they should supposedly be putting points over on?
I think an honest look shows that we don't have a Crosby, Zetterberg, Datsyuk or Ovechkin, or even a Gaborik, Backstrom, Richards, Carter, Chara, Thomas, etc. Right now the team is being led by Plekanec, who works at a formidable rate, but still paces well below a point a game (a pace that would be lower if he played defences as good as Philly's game in, game out). An honest assessment would show that the Habs are doing just as they should with the group they have. Probably even better considering their injuries.
Complaints about the system are just as porous. Necessity is the mother of invention and necessity has created this system.
When Jacques Martin was in Ottawa he coached a team that scored more goals than anyone, because he had the goalscorers to carry the strategy. In Florida he didn't. In Montreal he hasn't. Necessity in Montreal is a young (and, until recently, fragile) goaltender starting all games. Necessity is 3 veterans who can't skate all that fast, but who can compete when a system allows them to. Necessity is having two rookies make up the other defensive numbers. necessity is playing to Gomez and Gionta's strengths, which include a grounding in New Jersey hockey. Necessity is the absence of people to pick up any real slack beyond the top 6 forwards.
What other system would we have him employ? Opening up the ice doesn't look great on Hamrlik and Gill. Nor does it seem to suit forwards who despite being named fast, somehow always manage to find their coverage before the blueline. We'd all love to be Detroit, but years of good as well as lucky drafting aren't yet behind this team.
Finally, can we give a rest to the notion that Jacques Martin hasn't won anything?
What we mean is that he hasn't won a Stanley Cup. How many coaches have? A handful. How many have won with a team like these Canadiens? Less. Martin has won well over 600 NHL games. He's won the league, the division, the race to the playoffs more times than not. He's won something. he's won a Memorial Cup (one more than Guy Boucher).
No he's not Scotty Bowman, but Scotty's not coaching anymore.
It's fine to criticise the coach. I 'll do it in the future, I'm sure. In fact, criticise all you want. But if you alternatives enough can't be found to list against the complaints, consider before posting that maybe that's because there might not be very many.
And if your team sits well above the position of the year before and the one before that, consider that maybe the coaches are doing something right in amongst all their wrongs.
Just yesterday, a Guest posted this:
JM has to go ...he is a dinosaur holding back a fast team in the name of the almighty trap....he says nothing when we get jobbed by refs....dump him...etc., etc.
It was a comment among many similar comments seen at LIW and HI/O and FHF, and any Canadiens discussion forum. Usually I would respond to this comment in place. but as it seems to be a recurring theme, I thought a more lasting form of response was fitting.
The complaint
As far as I can tell, the common elements of the complaint against Martin are that:
a) He is boring
b) He employs a boring system of hockey (sometimes named "the trap")
c) He is stifling the team's talent
d) He doesn't yell enough behind the bench
e) This is costing the team wins
f) He has never won anything
These are very fair points. He is quite a boring interviewee (Personally, I deal with that by not listening to any of his interviews). He does favour some defensive responsibility, a variation on the trap. And he certainly never yells at the referees. All true.
Where I start to take issue is with the notion that we extrapolate these things into our personal conclusions. That defensive play is stifling the talent, that this is costing the team wins. That not ranting over calls is costing points and wins.
I think some of these stretch the imagination. Don't you?
To those who really believe he is stifling the team. I ask you to consider an honest assessment of the talent on the team. What sets this group apart from the 9 teams ahead of the Canadiens that they should supposedly be putting points over on?
I think an honest look shows that we don't have a Crosby, Zetterberg, Datsyuk or Ovechkin, or even a Gaborik, Backstrom, Richards, Carter, Chara, Thomas, etc. Right now the team is being led by Plekanec, who works at a formidable rate, but still paces well below a point a game (a pace that would be lower if he played defences as good as Philly's game in, game out). An honest assessment would show that the Habs are doing just as they should with the group they have. Probably even better considering their injuries.
Complaints about the system are just as porous. Necessity is the mother of invention and necessity has created this system.
When Jacques Martin was in Ottawa he coached a team that scored more goals than anyone, because he had the goalscorers to carry the strategy. In Florida he didn't. In Montreal he hasn't. Necessity in Montreal is a young (and, until recently, fragile) goaltender starting all games. Necessity is 3 veterans who can't skate all that fast, but who can compete when a system allows them to. Necessity is having two rookies make up the other defensive numbers. necessity is playing to Gomez and Gionta's strengths, which include a grounding in New Jersey hockey. Necessity is the absence of people to pick up any real slack beyond the top 6 forwards.
What other system would we have him employ? Opening up the ice doesn't look great on Hamrlik and Gill. Nor does it seem to suit forwards who despite being named fast, somehow always manage to find their coverage before the blueline. We'd all love to be Detroit, but years of good as well as lucky drafting aren't yet behind this team.
Finally, can we give a rest to the notion that Jacques Martin hasn't won anything?
What we mean is that he hasn't won a Stanley Cup. How many coaches have? A handful. How many have won with a team like these Canadiens? Less. Martin has won well over 600 NHL games. He's won the league, the division, the race to the playoffs more times than not. He's won something. he's won a Memorial Cup (one more than Guy Boucher).
No he's not Scotty Bowman, but Scotty's not coaching anymore.
It's fine to criticise the coach. I 'll do it in the future, I'm sure. In fact, criticise all you want. But if you alternatives enough can't be found to list against the complaints, consider before posting that maybe that's because there might not be very many.
And if your team sits well above the position of the year before and the one before that, consider that maybe the coaches are doing something right in amongst all their wrongs.
Wednesday, July 29, 2009
Playing The System
GMs That Are Ahead Of The Curve
Every time you hear that Saku Koivu is gone because he couldn't fit under the cap, think again.
Koivu, by virtue of celebrating his 35th birthday this November and not earlier was eligible to sign one of those brain-bustingly long salaries that could have been averaged out to a minimal cap hit.
You know the ones that Detroit and Scotty Bowman's Blackhawks are handing out?
Now, I fully believe that Gainey wanted the space on the team and not the space in the balance book when he waved goodbye to Saku, but what about some of his other signings? Where was the creativity when he signed up 30-year old Brian Gionta to a financially tying $5 million cap hit for the next 5 years?
It got me thinking about the better GMs in the NHL and what they have been doing to show up their slower peers.
The long contract
This summer has seen the advent of the extended contract beyond the age of 40 years old.
The idea behind the long contract has been a round a while now. The Islanders broke the ice with a 15-year deal to Rick DiPietro back in 2006. The Flyers gave out a few, most notably to Mike Richards.
But it was not until the Red Wings came along and signed Henrik Zetterberg that the manipulation of numbers really came into effect.
The DiPietro deal, you see was the same salary for every year of the contract. At the time, one could argue that it was an overpay for the player, an argument that only seems to take on more credence as time goes by. It was in effect, just a really bad long contract.
Ditto the Mike Richards deal. The Flyers handed out the deal to a 22-year old who'd had one decent year earlier in his breakout season. They ended up paying him a wad more than they could have been for the past year and by virtue of his age, the benefit of retirement is unlikely to help them. It opened the door for a trade later in the contract, but Holmgren just didn't have the same grasp on the possibilities as his sleeker peers. After all, a two-way forward like Mike Richards (if he's all we have to hear is from Flyers fans) will not be an untradeable asset by the age of 34. If he is, who would take on the $5.75 million cap hit anyway? Only teams covering the minimum...
The Zetterberg deal was different. It used term to reduce the average to a superstar player. Henrik will be paid a worthy salary of $7+ million for the next 9 seasons, then when he turns 37, he'll drop to half with 2 seasons at $1 million for the flourish. The drastic drop means the Wings pay the player over $7 million, but at a $6 million cap hit. Should he do the Forsberg and opt for cruising the Stockholm archipelago by his late 30s, the Wings have a minor cap coup and Zetterberg gets most of his money.
Always a team to push limits, the Wings went further with their next extension. Johan Franzen is tied to the team until the age of 39 as well, but at a bargain price just under $4 million a year on the cap. He will of course be paid well over $5 million a season (like Gionta) until his late 30s, but then opens the window to Scandinavian motor-boating with 4 final seasons where he'd only be collecting $7 million in all.
The Red Wings have set a revolution in place in this regard, but leave it to the master (and Holland's teacher) to show everyone that it can be done even better than that. The Marian Hossa contract is that masterpiece. In designing a contract that pays Hossa $3.5 million over the last 4 seasons, they were able to secure a $7.5 million dollar player at 2/3 the cap hit. Not only that, he stole Hossa from under the Wings' very noses.
While heralded in some quarters as madness, the reality is closer to genius. As this Ottawa Citizen article stated a few weeks ago:
Retirement is the key, and right now the possibilities to push this kind of salary are almost limitless. One blogger asks why stop at 12, 15 years; why not 30 years?
And he's right for asking, because although there are limits on contracts offered to players over the age of 35, there's no current limit as to the number of years a player of age 22 (like Carey Price for example) could be signed for. 30 seems ridiculous, but really why stop there?
Loophole will be closed
Upstanding NHL citizen, rarely jealous, spiteful or arrogant, Brian Burke is upset about the lack of fair play. And, he, along with other slowpokes, will probably see the loophole closed so that they can continue to get to grips with 1-year deals.
Funny how some loopholes seem more despicable than others to ole Brian.
Incidentally, as a Habs fan, I want this loophole closed and fast. It hardly seems fair that we be the only team still paying what the cap hit says to players whose performance is far from guaranteed. I think it's only fair that other teams, no matter how good their GMs should also be held to terrible contracts instead of being able to wriggle out, just because they are better at their jobs than their rivals.
"You're not thinking 4th dimensionally"
Gainey it seems is not in the same plane as his mosre successful rivals, at least not as a devious pursuer of vitory at all costs. After all, in addition to adding one of the worst value contracts in the whole league to his roster, he also gave out two of the most questionable deals of the summer to Cammalleri and Gionta.
I think he's failed us in this regard, he's not near the head of the class. And, just as Doc Brown scolded Marty for being such a simpleton (even after 2.5 movies worth of time travelling), I could see better GMs scolding Gainey for his summer:
Bob: "But I don't want Gionta for 22 years, I only want him for 5."
Doc Bowman: "Sign him for 22 years with every year after 40 at current league minimum. If he retires, you don't pay him."
Bob: "Still, that's almost 5 years of Gionta that I don't want."
Doc Bowman: "Bob, you're not thinking 4th dimensionally. Have you ever made a trade? Have you ever thought about how to become the best GM? Cap hits are important. By averaging salary over more time, you can reduce the cap hit for a future suitor. You make an untradeable asset tradeable, even within your ridiculous $5 million per year period..."
The man who tries so hard
Speaking of rivals, it's hard not to chuckle at poor Paul Holmgren who tries his very best to keep up with the Detroits and Chicagos of the world.
It started with Richards, whose contract we deem just expensive and unnecessarily unbalanced. It got even more comical with Briere and then Timonen. But this summer he really took the cake.
Taking his inspiration from Franzen and Hossa, Holmgren promptly signed newly acquired Chris Pronger to a long-term deal, well past the date where he'd be on the team. He even overpaid in a trade for the privilege.
At first glance what he did was OK. He signed a 34-year old defenceman to several years, the final ones (which he hopefully wouldn't play) at league minimum. What Paul didn't grasp was this – Chris Pronger had a contract already. His next contract will come into force next summer (and here's the tragedy) after he turn 35. If there was any doubt, it was cast aside when the league said that's how it would treat the deal.
Oops.
While trying to put together one of the best contracts in history, he has unwittingly added another chapter to the comedy of errors in the Flyers organization post-lockout. If Pronger retires instead of playing for $500 K, Holmgren's successor will be taking a $5 million cap hit for an empty locker – which would probably be up there for worst NHL contract ever. All's not lost though, he could force Pronger to play as he slows down and just have a really slow and ineffective defender for the very same cap hit.
Maybe Gainey missed saving a few million on Gionta, but at least he didn't Holmgren his team into a hole. Oh, it'll be fun to play those 2014-15 Flyers...
Koivu, by virtue of celebrating his 35th birthday this November and not earlier was eligible to sign one of those brain-bustingly long salaries that could have been averaged out to a minimal cap hit.
You know the ones that Detroit and Scotty Bowman's Blackhawks are handing out?
Now, I fully believe that Gainey wanted the space on the team and not the space in the balance book when he waved goodbye to Saku, but what about some of his other signings? Where was the creativity when he signed up 30-year old Brian Gionta to a financially tying $5 million cap hit for the next 5 years?
It got me thinking about the better GMs in the NHL and what they have been doing to show up their slower peers.
The long contract
This summer has seen the advent of the extended contract beyond the age of 40 years old.
The idea behind the long contract has been a round a while now. The Islanders broke the ice with a 15-year deal to Rick DiPietro back in 2006. The Flyers gave out a few, most notably to Mike Richards.
But it was not until the Red Wings came along and signed Henrik Zetterberg that the manipulation of numbers really came into effect.
The DiPietro deal, you see was the same salary for every year of the contract. At the time, one could argue that it was an overpay for the player, an argument that only seems to take on more credence as time goes by. It was in effect, just a really bad long contract.
Ditto the Mike Richards deal. The Flyers handed out the deal to a 22-year old who'd had one decent year earlier in his breakout season. They ended up paying him a wad more than they could have been for the past year and by virtue of his age, the benefit of retirement is unlikely to help them. It opened the door for a trade later in the contract, but Holmgren just didn't have the same grasp on the possibilities as his sleeker peers. After all, a two-way forward like Mike Richards (if he's all we have to hear is from Flyers fans) will not be an untradeable asset by the age of 34. If he is, who would take on the $5.75 million cap hit anyway? Only teams covering the minimum...
The Zetterberg deal was different. It used term to reduce the average to a superstar player. Henrik will be paid a worthy salary of $7+ million for the next 9 seasons, then when he turns 37, he'll drop to half with 2 seasons at $1 million for the flourish. The drastic drop means the Wings pay the player over $7 million, but at a $6 million cap hit. Should he do the Forsberg and opt for cruising the Stockholm archipelago by his late 30s, the Wings have a minor cap coup and Zetterberg gets most of his money.
Always a team to push limits, the Wings went further with their next extension. Johan Franzen is tied to the team until the age of 39 as well, but at a bargain price just under $4 million a year on the cap. He will of course be paid well over $5 million a season (like Gionta) until his late 30s, but then opens the window to Scandinavian motor-boating with 4 final seasons where he'd only be collecting $7 million in all.
The Red Wings have set a revolution in place in this regard, but leave it to the master (and Holland's teacher) to show everyone that it can be done even better than that. The Marian Hossa contract is that masterpiece. In designing a contract that pays Hossa $3.5 million over the last 4 seasons, they were able to secure a $7.5 million dollar player at 2/3 the cap hit. Not only that, he stole Hossa from under the Wings' very noses.
While heralded in some quarters as madness, the reality is closer to genius. As this Ottawa Citizen article stated a few weeks ago:
"The unspoken reality. GMs expect players to retire before those contracts are actually fulfilled -- but that seven- or 12-year term brings the average of the contract down to a very manageable level."
Retirement is the key, and right now the possibilities to push this kind of salary are almost limitless. One blogger asks why stop at 12, 15 years; why not 30 years?
And he's right for asking, because although there are limits on contracts offered to players over the age of 35, there's no current limit as to the number of years a player of age 22 (like Carey Price for example) could be signed for. 30 seems ridiculous, but really why stop there?
Loophole will be closed
Upstanding NHL citizen, rarely jealous, spiteful or arrogant, Brian Burke is upset about the lack of fair play. And, he, along with other slowpokes, will probably see the loophole closed so that they can continue to get to grips with 1-year deals.
Funny how some loopholes seem more despicable than others to ole Brian.
Incidentally, as a Habs fan, I want this loophole closed and fast. It hardly seems fair that we be the only team still paying what the cap hit says to players whose performance is far from guaranteed. I think it's only fair that other teams, no matter how good their GMs should also be held to terrible contracts instead of being able to wriggle out, just because they are better at their jobs than their rivals.
"You're not thinking 4th dimensionally"
Gainey it seems is not in the same plane as his mosre successful rivals, at least not as a devious pursuer of vitory at all costs. After all, in addition to adding one of the worst value contracts in the whole league to his roster, he also gave out two of the most questionable deals of the summer to Cammalleri and Gionta.
I think he's failed us in this regard, he's not near the head of the class. And, just as Doc Brown scolded Marty for being such a simpleton (even after 2.5 movies worth of time travelling), I could see better GMs scolding Gainey for his summer:
Bob: "But I don't want Gionta for 22 years, I only want him for 5."
Doc Bowman: "Sign him for 22 years with every year after 40 at current league minimum. If he retires, you don't pay him."
Bob: "Still, that's almost 5 years of Gionta that I don't want."
Doc Bowman: "Bob, you're not thinking 4th dimensionally. Have you ever made a trade? Have you ever thought about how to become the best GM? Cap hits are important. By averaging salary over more time, you can reduce the cap hit for a future suitor. You make an untradeable asset tradeable, even within your ridiculous $5 million per year period..."
The man who tries so hard
Speaking of rivals, it's hard not to chuckle at poor Paul Holmgren who tries his very best to keep up with the Detroits and Chicagos of the world.
It started with Richards, whose contract we deem just expensive and unnecessarily unbalanced. It got even more comical with Briere and then Timonen. But this summer he really took the cake.
Taking his inspiration from Franzen and Hossa, Holmgren promptly signed newly acquired Chris Pronger to a long-term deal, well past the date where he'd be on the team. He even overpaid in a trade for the privilege.
At first glance what he did was OK. He signed a 34-year old defenceman to several years, the final ones (which he hopefully wouldn't play) at league minimum. What Paul didn't grasp was this – Chris Pronger had a contract already. His next contract will come into force next summer (and here's the tragedy) after he turn 35. If there was any doubt, it was cast aside when the league said that's how it would treat the deal.
Oops.
While trying to put together one of the best contracts in history, he has unwittingly added another chapter to the comedy of errors in the Flyers organization post-lockout. If Pronger retires instead of playing for $500 K, Holmgren's successor will be taking a $5 million cap hit for an empty locker – which would probably be up there for worst NHL contract ever. All's not lost though, he could force Pronger to play as he slows down and just have a really slow and ineffective defender for the very same cap hit.
Maybe Gainey missed saving a few million on Gionta, but at least he didn't Holmgren his team into a hole. Oh, it'll be fun to play those 2014-15 Flyers...
Wednesday, July 15, 2009
2nd Montrealer Named To NHL GM Post
On Monday, Michel Bergeron ran a piece reminding us all to be very proud of Jacques Lemaire and Mario Tremblay for keeping their jobs in the NHL.
When the news arrived today for me, I dug through a piece on Dale Tallon's failings to learn that Stan Bowman was to be named GM of the Chicago Blackhawks. While, I'm sure Michel's article is well in the works celebrating the Montrealers able to climb the GM rankings, I decided I couldn't wait any longer.
Quebec GMs were going out of style like Russian wingers
When Steve Tambellini took over from Kevin Lowe as the GM for the Oilers, the number of Quebec-born GMs fell to a mere four (Cliff Fletcher, Bryan Murray, Francois Giguere and Dale Tallon; Jacques Martin born in an Ottawa suburb, of course). The news got worse when Fletcher was asked to step aside for a louder alternative and Giguere was let go to be replaced by someone from Scranton, PA – a city more renowned for being mocked as dull on TV sitcoms than for raising hockey masterminds.
The Montreal numbers looked worse, where Cliff Fletcher was the last remnant.
All the while, Ontario was plowing along with 11 GMs; there were an embarrassing (to Montreal anyway) 5 GMs from New England, 5 others from the US and a handful from Western Canada. The way Quebec was faring, you'd have thought Trevor Timmins was the leaguewide consultant on GM hirings.
But in late May, the tides began to turn. Doug Riseborough (a man with good Montreal links himself) was let go. He was replaced by Chuck Fletcher, the son of the aforementioned Silver Fox, who himself was born in Montreal way back when his Dad worked for the Habs in the 1960s.
Today, we get news that one Quebec-born GM will be replaced by another as Rouyn-Noranda's (and Toronto's) Dale Tallon will be replaced by Stan Bowman, the son of Montreal Canadiens legend Scotty. His connection to Montreal is even stronger than Chuck's since his days in town went beyond his third birthday – right from 1973 up until the time Irving Grundman took over from Sam Pollock following the 1979 season.
From no Montreal sons running NHL teams to two in a matter of 2 months. It's quite a turn around and one worth sounding the trumpet for.
Frank Selke's heirs
Geographic origins aside, these two appointments are very interesting for other reasons. Both these GMs are young and both are the sons of men who have shaped the NHL for the past four decades or more.
Scotty Bowman needs no introduction to fans of the Canadiens. He is our legendary coach at the NHL level, of course, winning a number of Cups in the 1970s. However, it is often forgot that he also played the part of prospect, scout and minor league coach for the Habs. His first coaching job was beside Sam Pollock with the 56-57 and 57-58 editions of the Ottawa Junior Canadiens. Next he coached the Petereborough Petes (Montreal-affiliated, of course). Finally, he jumped at the chance to make it in the NHL when the St. Louis Blues came calling following expansion. A few Stanley Cup finals later, he was back in Montreal coaching the Habs and naming his son after the trophies he was winning.
Cliff Fletcher was a Montreal boy as well, though his story is less well known in Canadiens lore (probably because his biggest successes came in winning a Cup in Montreal for the opposition and setting up a Maple Leafs team that would overshadow the Habs for most of the late 1990s). His career, though had strange parallels with Scotty's, though not on the ice where he never attained the top junior ranks. Like Scotty, his first coaching assignment came under the watchful eye of Sam Pollock in the late 1950s (then the overseer of all minor league and junior operations for the Canadiens). His duties expanded over the years to scouting, coaching and other player development tasks. By the time expansion came around, Cliff was mature enough and ready to take on bigger roles. His first step was to go to St. Louis like Scotty. And his first promotion was to become assistant GM to Scotty himself – the Montreal Canadiens tandem to outwork the other expansion franchises in those early years to a significant degree. Unlike Scotty, he never returned to Montreal, but instead took his own GM post with the expansion Atlanta Flames in 1971.
So Chuck and Stan not only trace shallow roots to the city of Montreal (like say Bryan Murray who went to school in Ste. Anne-de-Bellevue), but also back to the Montreal Canadiens themselves. Specifically, these two appointments can trace their hockey know how right back to the greatest GM of all time (Frank Selke) and his greatest rival for the title (Sam Pollock). Both sons of Selke employees and Pollock proteges.
It's an interesting development that comes at a time when the NHL needs new ideas and new minds to spice things up a bit. If they've retained even an iota of the wisdom their fathers must have soaked up from the "How to totally outwork and outperform the other NHL GMs" academy they attended in the 1950s and 60s, they'll be in good stead. One can only hope that their experience goes a little bit smoother than that of the man who in a way laid a path for them and all 30-something aspiring GMs – son of former Canadiens player, John Ferguson, Jr.
As for RDS's version of this piece, trust me I'll eagerly await Bergeron's parallel take on Stan Bowman and Chuck Fletcher. I'm sure he'll say something like he did regarding the coaches.
Oh, what the heck, in case he doesn't. We should all be proud of Chuck and Stan, Quebecois and Montrealais. With the departures of Francois Gigere, Kevin Lowe and Cliff Fletcher from the management reins of NHL teams, it's important that some Quebecers hang on and carry the torch for the rest of us.
And long live the Selke line...
When the news arrived today for me, I dug through a piece on Dale Tallon's failings to learn that Stan Bowman was to be named GM of the Chicago Blackhawks. While, I'm sure Michel's article is well in the works celebrating the Montrealers able to climb the GM rankings, I decided I couldn't wait any longer.
Quebec GMs were going out of style like Russian wingers
When Steve Tambellini took over from Kevin Lowe as the GM for the Oilers, the number of Quebec-born GMs fell to a mere four (Cliff Fletcher, Bryan Murray, Francois Giguere and Dale Tallon; Jacques Martin born in an Ottawa suburb, of course). The news got worse when Fletcher was asked to step aside for a louder alternative and Giguere was let go to be replaced by someone from Scranton, PA – a city more renowned for being mocked as dull on TV sitcoms than for raising hockey masterminds.
The Montreal numbers looked worse, where Cliff Fletcher was the last remnant.
All the while, Ontario was plowing along with 11 GMs; there were an embarrassing (to Montreal anyway) 5 GMs from New England, 5 others from the US and a handful from Western Canada. The way Quebec was faring, you'd have thought Trevor Timmins was the leaguewide consultant on GM hirings.
But in late May, the tides began to turn. Doug Riseborough (a man with good Montreal links himself) was let go. He was replaced by Chuck Fletcher, the son of the aforementioned Silver Fox, who himself was born in Montreal way back when his Dad worked for the Habs in the 1960s.
Today, we get news that one Quebec-born GM will be replaced by another as Rouyn-Noranda's (and Toronto's) Dale Tallon will be replaced by Stan Bowman, the son of Montreal Canadiens legend Scotty. His connection to Montreal is even stronger than Chuck's since his days in town went beyond his third birthday – right from 1973 up until the time Irving Grundman took over from Sam Pollock following the 1979 season.
From no Montreal sons running NHL teams to two in a matter of 2 months. It's quite a turn around and one worth sounding the trumpet for.
Frank Selke's heirs
Geographic origins aside, these two appointments are very interesting for other reasons. Both these GMs are young and both are the sons of men who have shaped the NHL for the past four decades or more.
Scotty Bowman needs no introduction to fans of the Canadiens. He is our legendary coach at the NHL level, of course, winning a number of Cups in the 1970s. However, it is often forgot that he also played the part of prospect, scout and minor league coach for the Habs. His first coaching job was beside Sam Pollock with the 56-57 and 57-58 editions of the Ottawa Junior Canadiens. Next he coached the Petereborough Petes (Montreal-affiliated, of course). Finally, he jumped at the chance to make it in the NHL when the St. Louis Blues came calling following expansion. A few Stanley Cup finals later, he was back in Montreal coaching the Habs and naming his son after the trophies he was winning.
Cliff Fletcher was a Montreal boy as well, though his story is less well known in Canadiens lore (probably because his biggest successes came in winning a Cup in Montreal for the opposition and setting up a Maple Leafs team that would overshadow the Habs for most of the late 1990s). His career, though had strange parallels with Scotty's, though not on the ice where he never attained the top junior ranks. Like Scotty, his first coaching assignment came under the watchful eye of Sam Pollock in the late 1950s (then the overseer of all minor league and junior operations for the Canadiens). His duties expanded over the years to scouting, coaching and other player development tasks. By the time expansion came around, Cliff was mature enough and ready to take on bigger roles. His first step was to go to St. Louis like Scotty. And his first promotion was to become assistant GM to Scotty himself – the Montreal Canadiens tandem to outwork the other expansion franchises in those early years to a significant degree. Unlike Scotty, he never returned to Montreal, but instead took his own GM post with the expansion Atlanta Flames in 1971.
So Chuck and Stan not only trace shallow roots to the city of Montreal (like say Bryan Murray who went to school in Ste. Anne-de-Bellevue), but also back to the Montreal Canadiens themselves. Specifically, these two appointments can trace their hockey know how right back to the greatest GM of all time (Frank Selke) and his greatest rival for the title (Sam Pollock). Both sons of Selke employees and Pollock proteges.
It's an interesting development that comes at a time when the NHL needs new ideas and new minds to spice things up a bit. If they've retained even an iota of the wisdom their fathers must have soaked up from the "How to totally outwork and outperform the other NHL GMs" academy they attended in the 1950s and 60s, they'll be in good stead. One can only hope that their experience goes a little bit smoother than that of the man who in a way laid a path for them and all 30-something aspiring GMs – son of former Canadiens player, John Ferguson, Jr.
As for RDS's version of this piece, trust me I'll eagerly await Bergeron's parallel take on Stan Bowman and Chuck Fletcher. I'm sure he'll say something like he did regarding the coaches.
Oh, what the heck, in case he doesn't. We should all be proud of Chuck and Stan, Quebecois and Montrealais. With the departures of Francois Gigere, Kevin Lowe and Cliff Fletcher from the management reins of NHL teams, it's important that some Quebecers hang on and carry the torch for the rest of us.
And long live the Selke line...
Friday, October 17, 2008
Former Habs Tussle
Bowman Gets His Man In Chicago
Former Habs Tussle
Bowman Gets His Man In Chicago
Inevitably, the shock about the firing of Denis Savard. Especially in his hometown.
I like Denis. Loved him as a player. Loved him behind the bench with Demers in 1993. I was as a happy as anyone when he was the one chosen to hoist that Cup above his head.
But, if I was a Blackhawks fan, I wouldn't be too upset. In matters of winning hockey games, I'd defer to a certain William Scott Bowman.
The hiring of Scotty Bowman was a masterstroke from Chicago after years of bobbing around the bottom of the standings. The subsequent hiring of Joel Quenneville and his 438-283-118 caching record was another move of brilliance considering they didn't even have an opening at the time.
The thinking man's analysis of this firing goes beyond a slow start and examines the complete organizational restructuring that's occurring in Chicago. Renaud Lavoie at RDS looked beyond Maxime Talbot and Jacques Demers's knee jerk reactions, and Steve Rosenbloom of the Chicago Tribune gives the most proximal and telling account of the situation.
These analysts were listening when the important man off to the side of Quenneville and Tallon spoke:
To be frank, I think the rest of the league may have something to fear in Chicago with Scotty in a greater position of control (as it clearly seems he is). I don't think he'll necessarily coach, but then again we saw that didn't matter in Detroit.
The thing to be learned from this situation, I think, is that sentimentality has no place in winning. Though it may be brutal, a certain cut-throat commitment to success must be taken with every decision. Take it from the man who is still the only heir apparent to the masters Selke and Pollock.
I've never though that Gainey lacks much. He certainly does have a ruthless streak (see Theodore, Julien, Huet, Ribeiro, etc.), but he has not shown he can distance himself from sentiment to the degree Mr. Bowman can yet (see Brisebois).
It'll be interesting to see what Scotty does next, particularly with the goalies. I hope Bob's watching...
I like Denis. Loved him as a player. Loved him behind the bench with Demers in 1993. I was as a happy as anyone when he was the one chosen to hoist that Cup above his head.
But, if I was a Blackhawks fan, I wouldn't be too upset. In matters of winning hockey games, I'd defer to a certain William Scott Bowman.
The hiring of Scotty Bowman was a masterstroke from Chicago after years of bobbing around the bottom of the standings. The subsequent hiring of Joel Quenneville and his 438-283-118 caching record was another move of brilliance considering they didn't even have an opening at the time.
The thinking man's analysis of this firing goes beyond a slow start and examines the complete organizational restructuring that's occurring in Chicago. Renaud Lavoie at RDS looked beyond Maxime Talbot and Jacques Demers's knee jerk reactions, and Steve Rosenbloom of the Chicago Tribune gives the most proximal and telling account of the situation.
These analysts were listening when the important man off to the side of Quenneville and Tallon spoke:
"With a young team, that's [ultra-experienced coaches in the Central division] tough to deal with," Bowman said. "This was not done on a whim."
To be frank, I think the rest of the league may have something to fear in Chicago with Scotty in a greater position of control (as it clearly seems he is). I don't think he'll necessarily coach, but then again we saw that didn't matter in Detroit.
The thing to be learned from this situation, I think, is that sentimentality has no place in winning. Though it may be brutal, a certain cut-throat commitment to success must be taken with every decision. Take it from the man who is still the only heir apparent to the masters Selke and Pollock.
I've never though that Gainey lacks much. He certainly does have a ruthless streak (see Theodore, Julien, Huet, Ribeiro, etc.), but he has not shown he can distance himself from sentiment to the degree Mr. Bowman can yet (see Brisebois).
It'll be interesting to see what Scotty does next, particularly with the goalies. I hope Bob's watching...
Monday, August 04, 2008
Scott's family wants Cup: Part II
For the second time in recent years, the biggest signing of the off-season chose his team based on family ties. For the second time, he's called Scott. The first time, for the Niedermayers, it worked, and it just could again (well soon, anyway).
I hope Chicago understand what they've gone and done here. They've gone and acquired the single most successful living hockey brain anywhere. They have made the biggest and most important move of the NHL offseason. It's making their recruitment of Stan Bowman look like a stroke of genius...
Sidney Crosby may be right in some of his assertions regarding Marian Hossa, but he is wrong if he thinks Detroit has not changed this offseason. Losing Bowman has traditionally been as devastating to dynasties as losing their star player in recent times, just ask the 1980 Canadiens and the 1993 Penguins.
But it's not what happens to teams on Bowman's departure that is most impressive, but rather what tends to happen once he steps through the door.
Scotty's pedigree
Scotty Bowman was brought into the Canadiens organisation following his attenuated playing career with the Baby Habs. From the mid-50s to the mid-60s, he was the on-and-off-again coach of the Baby Habs himself, overseeing the Canadiens most valued possessions (their young signings) and tutoring them in the ways of the organisation and the champion.
When the NHL expanded, the ambitious Bowman moved away from his hometown and the Canadiens to take control of the coaching duties for the St. Louis Blues. In what was no small feat, he brought the fledgling franchise to the Stanley Cup finals in each of its first three seasons – losing twice to his some of his wards from the Canadiens and once to Bobby Orr and the Bruins. What is worthy of note here is that Scotty was cutting his teeth in the Stanley Cup finals (as a coach) as a mere 34 year-old.
When he left the Blues, the Canadiens and Sam Pollock (never one to miss out on a quick way to improve his team) welcomed Scotty back into the fold. He didn't win the Cup in his first season, but as his team's record will attest, that was probably more to do with Esposito and Orr than any deficiencies of his own. The following season, the Canadiens would win the championship, and we all remember the 4 in a row to end Bowman's tenure. His acrimonious exit would coincide with the end of the Canadiens dynasty.
Following the Habs, Bowman had a relatively quiet decade. Critics of his would certainly pick on his tenure with the Buffalo Sabres as a sign that Bowman is not always a magician. This is certainly true. But, to coach any team in the era of the Islanders and Oilers was a monumental task. Even in the absence of Cups, his Sabres enjoyed mild success. They would have 2 100-point seasons and have their winningest period in team history to that point.
His next foray into NHL action was with the Pittsburgh Penguins. First as an advisor, then as head coach, he helped guide the talent-heavy Penguins to back-to-back Stanley Cups. You get the feeling, he might have also had some say in that prophetic draft pick of Jaromir Jagr in 1990 and the important trade for Ron Francis, as well. Whatever you may say about Bowman and the Pens, one thing is clear: they won with him there and not when he wasn't. It is this knack for coaxing the best from stars like Jacques Plante, Guy Lafleur, Mario Lemieux and Sergei Fedorov that was so important.
Speaking of Fedorov, Bowman's latest association with the Red Wings has resulted in the only uninterrupted and unquestioned streak of championship success in the modern game. As with the Penguins, he provided a catalyst for success for a squad that had to that point been underachieving based on their talent. The latest feather in his cap, his ninth Stanley Cup this spring, was testament to all the work he and his team of managers have done. The Red Wings completely outclassed the league this season in play and results. Their team, developed from within, mostly during Scotty's time in Detroit is a marvel and a model.
All this is why the move to sign up Scotty Bowman is a wonderful coup for the Hawks. I'll be watching with interest as he once again advises on the progress of young hotshots on the cusp of something more. If nothing else, you get the feeling Scotty is excited, and for the rest of the league, that is a dangerous thing...
Finally getting to work with his son is great. But for Canadiens fans, Scotty finally getting to work with Denis Savard (a fellow Verdun boy and Baby Hab alumnus) will be interesting too. For me, it harks back to one terrible decision in team history (Grundman over Bowman for GM) which was shortly followed by another (overlooking Denis Savard). Who knows, Scotty might have done things differently for us in the 1980 draft.
I hope Chicago understand what they've gone and done here. They've gone and acquired the single most successful living hockey brain anywhere. They have made the biggest and most important move of the NHL offseason. It's making their recruitment of Stan Bowman look like a stroke of genius...
Sidney Crosby may be right in some of his assertions regarding Marian Hossa, but he is wrong if he thinks Detroit has not changed this offseason. Losing Bowman has traditionally been as devastating to dynasties as losing their star player in recent times, just ask the 1980 Canadiens and the 1993 Penguins.
But it's not what happens to teams on Bowman's departure that is most impressive, but rather what tends to happen once he steps through the door.
Scotty's pedigree
Scotty Bowman was brought into the Canadiens organisation following his attenuated playing career with the Baby Habs. From the mid-50s to the mid-60s, he was the on-and-off-again coach of the Baby Habs himself, overseeing the Canadiens most valued possessions (their young signings) and tutoring them in the ways of the organisation and the champion.
When the NHL expanded, the ambitious Bowman moved away from his hometown and the Canadiens to take control of the coaching duties for the St. Louis Blues. In what was no small feat, he brought the fledgling franchise to the Stanley Cup finals in each of its first three seasons – losing twice to his some of his wards from the Canadiens and once to Bobby Orr and the Bruins. What is worthy of note here is that Scotty was cutting his teeth in the Stanley Cup finals (as a coach) as a mere 34 year-old.
When he left the Blues, the Canadiens and Sam Pollock (never one to miss out on a quick way to improve his team) welcomed Scotty back into the fold. He didn't win the Cup in his first season, but as his team's record will attest, that was probably more to do with Esposito and Orr than any deficiencies of his own. The following season, the Canadiens would win the championship, and we all remember the 4 in a row to end Bowman's tenure. His acrimonious exit would coincide with the end of the Canadiens dynasty.
Following the Habs, Bowman had a relatively quiet decade. Critics of his would certainly pick on his tenure with the Buffalo Sabres as a sign that Bowman is not always a magician. This is certainly true. But, to coach any team in the era of the Islanders and Oilers was a monumental task. Even in the absence of Cups, his Sabres enjoyed mild success. They would have 2 100-point seasons and have their winningest period in team history to that point.
His next foray into NHL action was with the Pittsburgh Penguins. First as an advisor, then as head coach, he helped guide the talent-heavy Penguins to back-to-back Stanley Cups. You get the feeling, he might have also had some say in that prophetic draft pick of Jaromir Jagr in 1990 and the important trade for Ron Francis, as well. Whatever you may say about Bowman and the Pens, one thing is clear: they won with him there and not when he wasn't. It is this knack for coaxing the best from stars like Jacques Plante, Guy Lafleur, Mario Lemieux and Sergei Fedorov that was so important.
Speaking of Fedorov, Bowman's latest association with the Red Wings has resulted in the only uninterrupted and unquestioned streak of championship success in the modern game. As with the Penguins, he provided a catalyst for success for a squad that had to that point been underachieving based on their talent. The latest feather in his cap, his ninth Stanley Cup this spring, was testament to all the work he and his team of managers have done. The Red Wings completely outclassed the league this season in play and results. Their team, developed from within, mostly during Scotty's time in Detroit is a marvel and a model.
All this is why the move to sign up Scotty Bowman is a wonderful coup for the Hawks. I'll be watching with interest as he once again advises on the progress of young hotshots on the cusp of something more. If nothing else, you get the feeling Scotty is excited, and for the rest of the league, that is a dangerous thing...
Finally getting to work with his son is great. But for Canadiens fans, Scotty finally getting to work with Denis Savard (a fellow Verdun boy and Baby Hab alumnus) will be interesting too. For me, it harks back to one terrible decision in team history (Grundman over Bowman for GM) which was shortly followed by another (overlooking Denis Savard). Who knows, Scotty might have done things differently for us in the 1980 draft.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)